The academic debate over the deterrent effect of capital punishment has intensified again with a major policy outcome at stake. About two dozen empirical studies have recently emerged that explore the issue. Donohue and Wolfers (2005) claim to have examined the recent studies and shown the evidence is not robust to specification changes. We argue that the narrow scope of their study does not warrant this claim. Moreover, focusing on our two studies that they have examined, we show the deterrence findings to be robust, while their work has serious flaw in analysis and selectivity in reporting the results. The selectivity is biased toward showing "no deterrence." This highlights the importance of a proper framework for guiding the sensitivity analysis of published work to guard against data-mining and agenda-driven empiricism. We hope that our study generates interest in appropriate ways to do sensitivity analysis of published work as much as it contributes to the debate about capital punishment.
I. Introduction
The deterrent effect of capital punishment has been the subject of passionate debates among scholars. Criminologists pioneered empirical analysis of the issue and found no deterrence (see, e.g., Sellin, 1959; Eysenck, 1970; and Cameron, 1994) . Economists entered the debate with Ehrlich's (1975 and work that introduced econometrics rigor into the analysis and reported a strong deterrent effect. Ehrlich's findings received considerable attention from the policy makers.
1 The attention prompted economists as well as criminologist to reexamine or extend Ehrlich's analysis with mixed results.
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During the past ten years, the interest in the issue has been reinvigorated as various states in the U.S. have considered changing their death penalty laws. A number of academic studies have also been added to the death penalty literature, mostly examining the recent evidence. Fourteen of these studies report some deterrence, six show no deterrence, and one is ambiguous. 3 Moreover, Sunstein and Vermeule (2005) draw on the collective deterrence evidence to argue that government has an obligation to act on the evidence and vigorously prosecute the death penalty.
1 The Solicitor General of the United States, for example, introduced Ehrlich's findings to the Supreme Court in support of capital punishment. (Fowler vs. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 904, 1976) . 2 For example, Yunker (1976) , Cloninger (1977) , Ehrlich and Gibbons (1977) , Layson (1985) , and Chressanthis (1989) report further deterrence evidence; Bowers and Pierce (1975) , Passel and Taylor (1977) , Hoenack and Weiler (1980) , McManus (1985) , Leamer (1983) , Cover and Thistle (1988) , McAleer and Veall (1989) , and Grogger (1990) find no deterrence; and Black and Orsagh (1978) find mixed results. 3 The studies that show deterrence include Brumm and Cloninger (1996) , Ehrlich and Liu (1999) , Lott and Landes (2000) , Cloninger and Marchesini (2001) , Yunker (2002) , Dezhbakhsh, Rubin, and Shepherd (2003) , Mocan and Gittings (2003) , Shepherd (2004) , Liu (2004) , Zimmerman (2004 and 2006a) , Cloninger and Marchesini (2005) , Dezhbakhsh and Shepherd (2006) , Ekelund, Jackson, Ressler, and Tollison (2006) . The no deterrence studies include Bailey (1998) , Albert (1999) , Sorenson, Wrinkle, Brewer, and Marquart (1999) , Stolzenberg and D'Alessio (2004) , Berk (2005) , and Fagan, Zimring, and Geller (2006) . Results reported by Katz, Levitt, and Shustorovich (2003) are mixed. We do not include Fagan (2006) in the above count as it is a compendium of verbal criticisms without any empirical analysis to back the author's assertions.
Reacting to Sunstein and Vermeule's policy call, Donohue and Wolfers (2005) conduct what they call a "thorough assessment of the statistical evidence on this important public policy issue" and claim to have found "little evidence for deterrence." 4 To determine whether their claim is on solid grounds, we carefully examine their sensitivity analysis of our two studies that constitute the bulk of their sample.
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Our findings raise serious doubts about Donohue and Wolfers' analysis, conclusions, and claims. 6 They have made a number of conceptual, statistical, and implementation errors that render their analysis invalid. Moreover, our replication of their work shows that, contrary to the norms of sensitivity analysis, their reporting of the key model estimates is highly selective, favoring results that show "no deterrence." A vast number of their sensitivity estimates that show deterrence are never reported, or even acknowledged. This suggests that the tools designed to safeguard against data-mining, are used by them to mine the data.
In addition, the scope of Donohue and Wolfers inquiry is far too limited to warrant writing the obituary of the deterrence findings. The sample of studies they choose to examine is small even if the relevant population is just the recent 21 papers listed above. In fact, six of the nine Donohue and Wolfers' tables focus only on two death penalty studies.
The only undisputable finding of Donohue and Wolfers is that the existing deterrence findings can be easily replicated, meeting an important requirement of scientific inquiries.
This finding, which is unfortunately lost in the welter of exaggerated claims, is a testimony 4 Donohue and Wolfers (2005) , pages 794 and 844. 5 These two studies are Dezhbakhsh, Rubin, and Shepherd (2003) and Dezhbakhsh and Shepherd (2006) . We also need to note that our purpose here is not to offer a point by point response to Donohue and Wolfers' critique of our studies.
Our aim is rather to analyze their methods and conclusions. 6 Zimmerman (2006b) documents several misrepresentations and errors in Donohue and Wolfers' study. Clonninger and Marchesini (2007) state that Donohue and Wolfers' measurement-related criticism of their work is baseless. Mocan and Gittings (2006) also raise doubts about Donohue and Wolfers' claims. to the credibility of the existing deterrence evidence, since such ease of replication might not be common in social science empirics.
The academic exchange between Donohue and Wolfers and the authors of a few death penalty studies might not be of great interest to every economist, but the issues that this exchange raises about sensitivity analysis are important to all empirical social scientists. Hendry (1980) , Lovell (1983) , and Leamer (1983 Leamer ( , 1985 all criticized data mining and whimsical choices in econometrics. Their classic critiques are as relevant now as they were then. These authors intended to provide guidelines for practitioners to produce more credible evidence by making valid choices. Equally important are the relevance and validity of choices made by sensitivity investigators who reexamine the work of other authors. They too need to follow protocols and systematic procedures to reexamine results and then impartially reporting the findings. After all, counter evidence based on invalid assumptions cannot be credible.
Our study shows that more work is needed in this area to guard against biased and agenda-driven approaches to sensitivity analysis. Specific guidelines and statistical protocol are needed to ensure objective and scientific sensitivity analysis of published studies. We hope that our study generates interests in proper ways to do sensitivity analysis as much as it contributes to the debate about capital punishment that seems to be heating up again with significant policy outcomes at stake (see Tanner, 2007) .
The paper is organized as follows: Section II briefly discusses data mining and sensitivity analysis in economics, and how such analysis can be abused. Section III describes the shortfalls of the Donohue and Wolfer's study, focusing on biased reporting and misleading presentation of results. This section also provides further evidence on robustness of the results reported in Dezhbakhsh and Shepherd (2006) . Section IV reveals statistical errors made by Donohue and Wolfers and the implications of such errors for their claim about the deterrent effect of capital punishment. Section V offers a summary and some concluding remarks.
II. Sensitivity Analysis in Economics
In a fascinating historical recount, Stephen Stigler (1986) discusses how various sciences adjusted their approaches to take advantage of the emerging tools of modern probability and statistics. Astronomers, for example, abandoned averaging methods to adopt linear models. Psychologists redesigned their experimental method. Social scientists, however, at first did not embrace linear models or experimental methods, as they were trying, with much frustration, to identify causal links by brute force and massive data bases.
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Despite some successes, however, the complexity of social phenomena continues to challenge the limits of empirical methods. In economics, the explosion of data, wide dissemination of econometric tools, canned programs, and computing capacity all offer researchers many choices, generating biased as well as unbiased research. Consequently, zealous researchers who seek new discoveries at any cost continue to create controversies and frictions in empirical economics.
Data Mining
7 Economists had their own share of these frustrations, reflected, for example, in the melodramatic exchange between economist William Stanley Jevons who had combined various prices into one index and his critics who were opposed to the notion of an index created from prices of vastly different commodities (See, Stigler, 1986 and Jevons, 1869) .
A hazardous practice that economists have been preached against is data mining, also known as fishing or data grubbing. 8 The practice involves estimating many, sometimes hundreds of, models in hope of obtaining a good fit. The exhaustive search can be guided by statistical metrics, such as coefficient of determination and Akaike Information Criterion, or by researcher's predispositions and even ideology. Lovell (1983) shows that when searching for best regressors, data mining can lead to unusually large significance levels (large type-I error), therefore, invalidating the traditional methods of inference. The scientific integrity of the work is also compromised when the search is agenda driven and its extent is veiled from the reader. 9 Other prominent econometricians who voiced concerns about econometric practice include Leamer (1983) who called for taking "the con out of econometrics," Hendry (1980) who characterized econometric practice as Alchemy, and Sims (1980) who argued that empirical macroeconomics is divorced from reality. Leamer's critiques (1983 and are more relevant to the current discussion as they focus on sensitivity analysis as a tool to examine the reliability of statistical inference.
Sensitivity Analysis
Econometric inference is usually based on a presumed model. A change in model assumptions-such as functional form, explanatory variables, or parametric restrictionscan alter the results. Sensitivity analysis refers to estimating models with alternative specifications. Accordingly, if various estimates of the parameter(s) of interest are similar, then the finding is robust. This tool is intended to guard against data mining and to enhance the credibility of empirical research (Chatfield, 1995) .
To provide a framework for sensitivity analysis, the uncertainty in nonexperimental inference can be categorized into two parts: the sampling uncertainty and misspecification uncertainty. 10 The former is rooted in sample changes and the latter in specification changes. For illustration, consider two spaces, one consisting of all possible model assumptions (assumption space) and the other consisting of all possible inference (inference space). There is a correspondence between the two spaces that applied econometricians try to map. If the mapping includes only a small segment of the assumption space, then the inference will be of limited use. Moreover, if this segment is selected through data mining, particularly with predisposition, then the inference will be suspect, and often invalid.
Sensitivity analysis involves expanding the mapping to a broader segment of the assumption space and reporting the corresponding inference. But a critical issue is what segments of the assumption space to cover in the expanded mapping. Constraints have to be imposed since a full mapping is impossible. The researcher's prior belief may also play a role here. To avoid arbitrariness and whimsy, however, informed conventions need to be used to impose discipline on such priors (Leamer, 1983 and . Accordingly, the analysis is conducted only over relevant segments of the assumption space. The range of the corresponding inference suggests whether the original inference is fragile or robust.
For example, in a linear regression model, a researcher who wants to examine the sensitivity of her results with respect to explanatory variables must first identify the variables that must be included in the regression. 
Fishing for Sensitivity Evidence
Sensitivity analysis is a useful tool for examining robustness, or fragility, of a statistical result. It can be used to dispel doubts or to create doubts about an inference. It is also a powerful tool that can be used to manipulate findings. Leamer as well as others have expressed concern about the potential for such abuses. Leamer (1985) suggests an organized and systematic approach to avoid manipulation or whimsy. In reference to the studies that attempted to examine Ehrlich's (1975) When a researcher does not adhere to a set of guidelines to perform the sensitivity checks in a systematic and methodical fashion, then the exercise can potentially turn into a fishing expedition, a con job, or groping in the dark. The culprits of such abuses can be a data miner who tries to convince the readers that his results are resilient, or a zealous skeptic who tries to cast doubt on a published study.
The data miners' abuses have been the subject of much criticism, leading to a higher scrutiny before publication. 12 The doubt casters' mischief, however, needs more scrutiny, because the practice is just as damaging. Indeed, the relative ease of obtaining irrelevant or invalid evidence of fragility (as discussed above), high likelihood of publishing such findings, and potential controversy that will result all provide incentives for empirical scavengers to fish for counter evidence at any cost. After all, obtaining someone else's data and tweaking their model over and over till a different inference emerges is much easier than collecting your own data, building an econometric model, developing a statistical strategy, and making an inference.
A number of safeguards for preempting the manipulation of sensitivity analysis come to mind.
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12 For example, as the result of these criticisms, many journal referees now require that authors perform specific sensitivity checks rather than making a general statement that results are robust. 13 This list is not intended to be exhaustive and is drafted drawing on the literature on sensitivity analysis and the authors' experiences.
1) The process (of fragility search) should be transparent, well documented, and reproducible.
2) The direction of the specification searches needs to be clearly explained and justified on theory and econometric grounds following statistical conventions.
3) Blatantly invalid estimates should not be included in establishing the range of an inference.
4) Results should not be reported selectively. Given the large number of sensitivity checks, economy of space requires presenting some results and not others. But the presented results should be representative, and the selection should not be agenda driven and misleading.
More importantly, all estimates of the free parameters (related to the focus variables) should be presented.
5)
If the sensitivity analysis involves several studies, then similar approaches should be applied to all studies and results should be presented without any bias toward a particular finding.
6) It is prudent to make the sensitivity results available to authors whose work has been examined, not as a courtesy, but as a safeguard against misunderstanding, misreporting, or other errors and omissions. This should precede any publication attempt to maintain the integrity of the scientific inquiry.
7) To gain credibility, the sensitivity analysis should go through the standard peer review to detect its errors and flaws before the study is published. Donohue and Wolfers (2005) claim that their sensitivity checks should raise doubts about the recent evidence on the deterrent effect of capital punishment. They examine a few studies which include ours (Dezhbakhsh, Rubin, and Shepherd, 2003; and Dezhbakhsh and Shepherd, 2006) . Our intention here is to show how following the "don't"s rather than the "do"s of sensitivity analysis can distort evidence and mislead readers. We do not offer a point by point response to their claims. Most of the shortcomings that we expose relate to Donohue and Wolfers' analysis of our studies, but some of these criticisms apply equally to their analysis of other studies that find deterrence.
III. Sensitivity Diagnostics and Biased Reporting
14 In this section we focus on Dezhbakhsh and Shepherd's (2006) study. 15 This study uses panel data for fifty states during the 1960-2000 period to examine the deterrent effect of capital punishment, using the moratorium as a "judicial experiment." Its results, based on a set of robustness checks involving 96 models, suggest that capital punishment has a deterrent effect, and that executions have a distinct effect which compounds the deterrent effect of merely (re)instating the death penalty.
Donohue and Wolfers reestimate some of the baseline models in this study under a number of arbitrarily assumptions. We first challenge the relevance of these assumptions.
But to put Donohue and Wolfers' claims to test, we then adopt these assumptions anyway and redo their analysis . Our results reveal that Donohue and Wolfers present the key estimates quite selectively. This selectivity is neither random nor benign; it, rather, tends to disguise the robustness of our results and misrepresent the findings in favor of "no deterrence."
Design of Sensitivity Checks
We had performed a large number of sensitivity checks in Dezhbakhsh and Shepherd (2006) . In addition to the main models, another 96 distinct regression equations were estimated that show robustness of the results with respect to changes in regressors, functional form, data, estimation method, and the possibility of capital punishment being a spurious finding stemming from common crime patterns. The prepublication version that Donohue and Wolfers examine includes 84 robustness checks, which they never acknowledge. They perform several additional checks that we discuss next.
Omitting Texas: Donohue and Wolfers argue that Texas has far more executions than other states and, therefore, should not have been included in the analysis. This is despite their own admission that Texas is not an outlier, as it shows close alignment with the estimated regression line. 16 We believe that Texas provides useful evidence for the deterrence hypothesis, because it applies the death penalty. Any deterrence from capital punishment is rooted more in the exercise of the law, than in status of the law. 17 of executions as a sample selection criterion, then states with too few executions must also be dropped.
However, throwing out data is a bad idea that most statistics textbooks warn against.
Statisticians have, indeed, devoted a lot of efforts to develop methods that deal with outliers and influential data points to encourage practitioners to use such data rather than discard them. 19 Throwing out an observation randomly only reduces the estimation accuracy, without biasing the resulting estimates. But, if the omission is based on a criterion-such as Donohue and Wolfers' "too many execution criterion"-then the outcome will be inaccuracy as well as estimation bias due to sample selectivity.
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De Facto Versus De Jure Laws: Another sensitivity check that Donohue and
Wolfers perform on our results involves changing the binary moratorium variable to make a distinction between states that apply their death penalty law and states that do not.
Accordingly, a state with a death penalty law is classified as a de jure death penalty state in any given year if it has not executed anyone during the previous ten years. A state that has executed at least one convict during the previous ten years is considered a de facto death penalty state. Although the idea may appear reasonable at first-especially if one ignores the arbitrariness of Donohue and Wolfers' ten year window and their failure to use alternative windows-it has flaws that surface upon careful examination.
For example, the de facto vs. de jure distinction is irrelevant considering that we did control for the application of execution in our various models by including as regressor(s) the number of executions and/or number of executions lagged by one period. More importantly, the way Donohue and Wolfers implement their de fact vs. de jure distinction is 19 See, e.g., Cook (1977, and 1982) and Welsch (1982) . 20 See, e.g., Wooldridge (2003) , chapter 9 for the perils of non-random data omission. the binary variable will take value of one from that point on until the next execution. For years prior to moratorium, past executions will determine whether the binary value is zero or one.
What we find peculiar is that instead of the above straight forward extension, Donohue and Wolfers implement their de facto law using two binary variables-one for active death penalty states and the other for inactive death penalty states. Given that each state is classified in one of the two categories in any given year, using two binary variables is quite unusual and inconsistent with standard practice as well as their own work; see, e.g., their Table 2 . Using two binary variables requires dropping the intercept and absorbing its effect into these binary variable in order to avoid a dummy trap. 21 The results we report later suggest that Donohue and Wolfers de facto moratorium finding is perhaps driven by the awkward implementation of de facto vs. de jure distinction rather than the distinction itself.
Cluster Correction: The easy fix that software packages offer for correcting the clustering effect, or cluster samples, has persuaded practitioners to use it, and often as a knee-jerk reaction. This is done without much attention to the statistical procedure that is applied when this option is invoked and the statistical properties of the resulting inference in terms of type I and type II errors. The correction adjusts the variance covariance matrix of the least squares coefficient estimates for intra group dependencies. The method is only asymptotically valid 22 -in other words, when the number of groups (clusters) relative to the size of each group approaches infinity-a condition that clearly does not hold in the current case. Moreover, the correction is subject to the same criticism as heteroskedastic-consistent covariance estimation. For example, Leamer (1994) 24 We find Donohue and Wolfers' assertion that we used OLS method disingenuous. We had communicated to them that we used weighted least squares with robust standard errors and cluster correction (e-mail available from the authors upon request). In fact, when attempting to replicate our work, they themselves use weighted least square which is GLS and not OLS; see Donohue and Wolfers (2005) Dezhbakhsh and Shepherd (2006) .
Time Trends:
To control for state and time specific factors we use a set of state and time specific binary variables. Four time specific binary variables were used each corresponding to one of the decades in our sample (60s, 70s, 80s, and 90s). This choice was based on the observation of crime trend similarities during various decades. These similarities are also pointed out by Donohue and Wolfers. 27 As an alternative they use year specific binary variables in their sensitivity checks. We have no problem with their choice and use it in our assessment of their sensitivity analysis.
Donohue and Wolfers' Biased Reporting of Sensitivity Results
Despite our serious reservations about the specification choices that Donohue and
Wolfers have made for their sensitivity checks on our results, we conducted a sensitivity 26 We are surprised that Donohue and Wolfers question this intuitive assumption. As an analogy, one can point to the diverse effect that one minute of TV advertising has in markets with different population densities, and, therefore, different viewer densities. Advertisers pay more for dense markets because of the bigger impact. 27 Donohue and Wolfers (2005) , page 796. reanalysis using their suggested specifications. Our analysis can serve two purposes. First, it adds to the extensive robustness checks reported in Dezhbakhsh and Shepherd (2006 We also correct for the argued clustering effect once by identifying states as members of a cluster, using cluster(year) option in STATA, and once by identifying years as members of a cluster, using cluster(state) option in STATA to account for possible within cluster dependencies. We also estimate models with and without Texas. Finally, we include year fixed effects (dummies) or decade fixed effects (dummies) in addition to the state fixed effects that are included in all of the estimated models. Overall, these specifications result in 80 different regressions, each with one or more deterrence estimates.
Results:
The deterrence coefficient estimates along with the corresponding t-statistics for all eighty cases are reported in Table 1 .
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Note that here the estimated coefficients for two of the deterrence variables are highly
significant. Yet they neither report these two estimates, and nor do they even mention their significance. Given that all deterrence coefficients are considered key parameters here, concealing their estimates under alternative specifications violates a sacred rule of sensitivity analysis.
In fact, it is a common practice in the sensitivity analysis to report the results related to all key parameters, even when some follow researcher's priors but others do not. For example, Bartley and Cohen (1998) use sensitivity analysis to examine the robustness of Lott and Mustard's (1997) findings about the effect of concealed handgun laws on crime 30 Their estimate for moratorium variable is -.47 which is close to our estimate of .4 for the moratorium variable. The difference in sign is trivial and due to their designation of 1 and 0 instead of 0 and 1 for the binary variable.
and find the primary effect to be robust but the substitution effect not to be robust across various specifications. They do report both results, however. Quinn (1997 ), Sjoholm (1996 , and Fowles and Loeb (1995) also report results for all key parameters of the model they examine without any exclusion. Unfortunately, Donohue and Wolfers analysis falls short of this inclusivity requirement. This is not an isolated reporting oversight, but rather part of a systematic pattern of reporting as will be exposed further in the following section.
In the next section we turn to statistical errors in Donohue and Wolfers' (2005) sensitivity analysis.
IV. Can Invalid Inference Serve as Evidence of Fragility?
Donohue and Wolfers claim that deterrence results based on simultaneous equation models of crime are also suspect due to fragility and other issues related to selection of instrumental variables for these models. Among the studies they examine are Dezhbakhsh, Rubin, and Shepherd (2003) and Zimmerman (2004) . Again, we focus on our own study, although some of the issues we raise apply to their criticism of Zimmerman's study as well. 31 Here we show that Donohue and Wolfers obtain some of their evidence in clear violation of the most basic statistical principles. Invalid estimates, and size-inflated inference, made through extensive data mining, are at the heart of their evidence.
Invalid Restrictions and Biased Estimates
One of Donohue and Wolfers' sensitivity checks involves changing the instruments we used to identify our simultaneous equation model. One such instrument is the partisan influence on the justice system. We measure the partisan influence by the Republican We disagree; "sorting that out" is a simple statistical task that can be performed easily and quickly using many statistical packages. But the implication is immense. Donohue and Wolfers specification assumes that the effect of partisan influences do not vary across elections, forcing it to be estimated with only one parameter. We, on the other hand, allow 32 The influence is exerted through changing the makeup of the court system by appointing new judges or prosecutors that are "tough on crime." This affects the justice system and its desire to convict and execute criminals. 33 They admit this point in footnote 84. Also, in our description of the partisan influence (PI) we should have stated "six PI variables" instead of "PI" to make the point clear. Nevertheless, as Donohue and Wolfers acknowledge in page 823, they had our computer programs that show we use six PI variables.
the data to determine whether the effect varies or not by estimating six parameters for the six elections. Only if the estimates of these six parameters turn out to be statistically the same, can one assume that the effect does not vary across elections. It is also not surprising that they find a strong deterrent effect in such cases, because by construction they create biased estimates that suggest executions take place in non-death penalty states. 37 For example, the difference-in-difference mean analysis reported in their table 1 panels B, C, and D, listed under "Our Innovation", contains an error. What they want to do in Penal D is to perform a matched (or paired) comparison, whereby the crime change for each state is subtracted from the crime change for its matched pairs, and then a one-sample location (mean) test is performed on these differences. What they do instead is a two sample comparison, whereby the overall average obtained for the treatment group is subtracted from the overall average obtained for the control group (averages reported in panel C is subtracted from the corresponding ones in Panel B). Calculation of the standard errors and the t-tests for the Donohue and Wolfers (2005) , top of page 827. 40 The first pick has a probability of 4/50 and the second pick a probability of 3/49 and the probability of the intersection is .0048.
Mining the Data to Determine What Data to Throw Away
extensive sample selection search whereby they throw out one state at a time. Instead of reporting the full range of the resulting estimates, however, they only report two of the nondeterrence cases without any mention of the other 46 cases where the deterrence result holds. This is, indeed, data mining, a practice that, ironically, sensitivity analysis is supposed to safeguard against. 41 We see two serious problems with this data elimination exercise and the way it is reported by Donohue and Wolfers. One is technical and the other ethical. On the technical side, it is inappropriate to throw away data, especially in cases where the data is quite relevant. Deterrence is the result of exercising capital punishment laws rather than having the law without applying it. So states like Texas are quite relevant for the analysis.
Moreover, estimating a large number of models in search of a particular outcome leads to statistical significance levels-also known as test size or probability of type-I error-that are much larger than the conventional 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. 42 Therefore, comparing these results with our results that were obtained from a single estimation with the full sample is inappropriate.
Furthermore, we believe that concealing the extent of the selection search (data mining), and characterizing the selection as arbitrary is inappropriate and misleading.
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Assume, for the sake of argument, that Donohue and Wolfers had stated that they estimated fifty models by dropping one state at a time and found a deterrent effect for capital 41 It is not difficult to change the magnitude or sign of an estimate through ex post manipulation of the sample, even in simple statistical inference. For example, consider estimation of the mean parameter using a small sample from a normal distribution. The resulting mean estimate is unbiased, but one can always try various combinations of data points to find a subset of the sample that its elimination changes the mean estimate significantly. The larger the variance of the distribution, the easier it is to change the mean estimate by changing sample, as the observations are more disperse and their elimination exerts more influence on the resulting mean estimate. Obviously, such manipulation is easier in more complex models. 42 Lovell's (1983) simulation of a data miner's selection of regressors with various search strategies reveal actual significance levels of close to 50% where the nominal significance levels were only 5%. 43 See, e.g. Lovell (1983) , page 11. punishment in 46 cases. Such full disclosure would give the reader a vastly different impression than their present claim that arbitrary selection of these two states reversed the deterrence results. The selective reporting of two estimates while veiling the full frequency distribution obtained from fifty estimates is hardly expected of an inquiry that is solely intended to set the record straight by revealing the uses and abuses of empirical evidence.
Invalid Instrumental Variable Test and Erroneous Interpretation
Donohue and Wolfers claim they have used Hausman specification test to show that the instruments in Dezhbakhsh, Rubin, and Shepherd (2003) are not valid. 44 Their claim, however, is based on misunderstanding the simultaneous equation model in our study, invalid application of Hausman test, and use of visual comparison instead of a statistical metric to make inference. Each of these is a serious error as we explain next.
We have four equations with four endogenous variables that include crime rate as well as the three probabilities of execution, conviction, and arrest:
M=f(P a , P c|a , P e|c , Z, TD, u 1 )
Pa=g(M, PE, TD, u 2 )
Pc|a=h(M, JE, PI, PA, TD, u 3 )
Pe|c=k(M, JE, PI, TD, u 4 )
where M is murder rate, P is probability (conditional probability) with a, c, and e denoting arrest, conviction, and execution (respectively), Z is a set of demographic/economic variables, PE is police payroll expenditure, JE is expenditure on judicial and legal system, PI is six partisan influence variables as measured by the Republican presidential candidate's percentage of the statewide vote in the most recent six elections (discussed above), PA is prison admission, TD is a set of time dummies that capture national trends, and u's are regression errors. 45 We estimate these equations via the two stage least squares (2SLS) method; see Dezhbakhsh, Rubin, and Shepherd (2003) , pages 356-360. 46 This is equivalent to instrumental variable estimation of these equations where the instruments are the predicted But our crime equation (1) does not include any of these instruments as control. In fact, it 45 The subscripts i and t are dropped and the linear equations are written in general form for expositional ease. 46 The first stage involves estimating the reduced forms of equations 1-4 and the second stage involves reestimating these equation while replacing the endogenous variables on the right hand side with their predicted values from the first stage. Also, appropriate correction is made to the standard errors to account for the fact that the residuals in the 2SLS estimation is the difference between the left hand side variable and the linear combination of the right hand side variables and not their predicted values, as obtained when least squares is applied in stage 2 of estimation; see, e.g., Davidson and MacKinnon (1993) , section 7.5 47 They obtain alternative estimates by (i) excluding PE, JE, and PA, or (ii) excluding the six PI variables from the set of instruments.
does not make sense to assume that crime rate is directly affected by variables such as partisan influence or judicial expenditures, rather than the indirect affect captured through P a , P c|a , P e|c . So Donohue and Wolfers have added inappropriate variables to equation (1), instead of simply dropping some of the exogenous variables from equations (2)- (4) Hausman (1978) or many standard econometric textbooks; e.g., Greene (2003, chapter 5), Johnston and DiNardo (1997, chapter 8) , and Davidson and MacKinnon (1993, chapter 11 Obviously, more work is still needed to provide appropriate protocol and guidelines to help "de-con" the practice of sensitivity analysis and promote proper and impartial sensitivity checks on published work. We reiterate that even in a simple inference like estimation of the mean of a random sample, one can search through the data points to identify sub-samples that produce mean estimates which are vastly different from the 51 See, e.g., Donohue and Wolfers (2005) Some of these errors could have been easily avoided had they followed normal scientific procedures by seeking comments from the concerned authors. But they only sent 52 Donohue and Wolfers (2005), page 844. 53 See the introduction of this paper for a list of these 21 studies. Donohue and Wolfers have been aware of all but perhaps one (Fagan, Zimring, and Geller, 2006) of these studies which have all been cited in Dezhbakhsh and Shepherd (2006) or Shepherd's congressional testimony that Donohue and Wolfers cite in footnote 11 of their 2006 study. The four studies they examine include Dezhbakhsh, Rubin, and Shepherd (2003) , Dezhbakhsh and Shepherd (2006) , Katz, Levitt, and Shustorovich (2003) , and Mocan and Gittings (2003) . They also briefly touch on three others studies by Marchesini (2001 and 2005) and Zimmerman (2004) , without a detailed sensitivity analysis. 54 Six of the nine tables reporting their sensitivity checks are devoted to two studies, Dezhbakhsh and Shepherd (2006) and Dezhbakhsh, Rubin, and Shepherd (2003) .
us their paper when it was about to go to print. 55 More importantly, they chose to publish their econometric study in a student-refereed law review rather than a peer-refereed economics journal. Law students have no particular expertise in econometrics to identify the aforementioned errors. Obviously, the flaws in the paper could have been detected by expert refereeing, if they had submitted their paper to a peer reviewed outlet. 56 We did ask the Stanford Law Review the right to reply, but were not granted this right. Review had given them to make further revisions, as they stated in their e-mail. Despite various prior e-mails where they sought our help with data and computer codes, they never communicated to us the exact purpose of their study or their findings until that Friday evening. Moreover, the paper was already in the Stanford Law Review format, indicating that they had prepared it much earlier. 56 We find it quite amusing that Wolfers in an interview with Tanner (2007) refers to deterrence findings as "flimsy [results] that appeared in second-tier journals." The studies he refers to have gone through rigorous peer review process, often blind review, and appeared in economics peer reviewed journals, while his finding with Donohue, that he uses to call the deterrence studies flimsy, has never been peer reviewed and appears only in a student edited/refereed journal. 57 Donohue and Wolfers (2005) , page 845.
Appendix
The most important task in sensitivity analysis is to choose the direction of inquiry over a large dimensional assumption space. This makes the task hard for those who want to conduct a thorough analysis and easy for those who want to fish for counter evidence no matter how inappropriate or irrelevant it might be. The choices should, indeed, be made while keeping in mind that not all estimates are created equal. The following example helps illustrate this point. Consider the regression equation Ehrlich and Liu (1999) are also in a similar spirit. 
